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INTRODUCTION
n this Essay, I want to place regulatory takings in the context of
what I think is a broader movement in the evolution of modern
environmental regulation. I will argue that one of the currents affect-
ing the intersection of regulatory takings and environmental regula-
tion is a rearward pendulum swing in the evolution of environmental
regulation generally.
I will then offer two perspectives from which to view this swing and
the related takings cases. The first is a blunt Critical Legal Studies
("CLS")' critique, casting this movement as an open political conflict
between traditionalists and progressives. I will contend, that, ulti-
mately, this critique is insufficient.
The second perspective suggests that our conversation about the de-
velopment of environmental regulation is a vital balm and distraction
from very discomforting choices we have made in the shadows of our
public debates. I will contend that we have chosen to consume the
biosphere almost as fast as we know how, to the profound detriment
of the unrepresented future. I will suggest that submerging the conse-
quences of our shadow choices and assuaging our guilt is one of the
primary functions of our environmental regulatory debates and the
intersecting takings cases.
This second perspective renders inadequate the blunt CLS critique
of the regulatory takings doctrine and environmental regulatory
evolution generally. It suggests that a more traditional view of doctri-
nal evolution-viz., that doctrine responds to the objectively discerni-
ble needs of our society-better explains the developments in this
area.
* Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law.
1. The CLS movement emerged in the 1970s as an effort to expose the fallacy of
the claim that the law, and "justice" under the law, could be objectively and coher-
ently understood within our legal system. Owen Fiss, What is Feminism?, 26 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 413, 424 (1994). CLS scholars asserted that the development of the law was es-
sentially an exercise of political will and power, and that the product of that process
was inherently indeterminate and could not be logically or neutrally applied to indi-
vidual cases. Id.; WALTER F. MURPHY & C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, COURTS, JUDGES,
& POLITICS 7 (4th ed. 1986).
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I. NURTURING AND PRUNING
Let me suggest first that modern environmental regulation, as char-
acterized principally by the foundational federal statutes enacted since
1970, covering air, water, and the landbase, emerged and grew in an
atmosphere of emergency. Operating in this atmosphere of emer-
gency, the organism was openly nurtured by necessity-driven
decisionmaking z
This is illustrated in many of the decisions that arose from the foun-
dational statutes. For instance, I think we see this in some of the
RCRA3 corrective action cases,4 cases dealing with passive disposal5
and retroactive application issues,6 cases shoring up the confused and
troublesome formula for defining hazardous waste,7 CERCLA8 cases
confronting ex post facto challenges,9 and, in various judicial treat-
ments of pre-enforcement review issues.'" These decisions exhibit a
necessity-driven bias that only superficially grapples with very troub-
lesome aspects of the regulatory organism, one that, if taken seriously,
might have fatally weakened it.
2. Elsewhere, I have argued that such perceptions of necessity may be sufficient
to overcome any of our artificial societal self constraints (e.g., constitutions, concep-
tions of liberty, individualism, freedom); that all of these abstractions may yield ulti-
mately to the concern at the base of Maslow's hierarchy-physical survival. Nicholas
J. Johnson, EPCRA's Collision with Federalism, 27 IND. L. REV. 549 (1994).
3. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6986
(1988 & Supp. V 1993) (amending the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-
6922k (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
4. See, e.g., Inland Steel Co. v. EPA, 901 F.2d 1419 (7th Cir. 1990).
5. See, e.g., Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 840 (4th
Cir. 1992) (stating CERCLA imposes liability on party who owns facility at time haz-
ardous waste is leaking because, "Any other result would substantially undermine
CERCLA's goal of encouraging voluntary cleanup.").
6. See Wagner Seed Co. v. Bush, 709 F. Supp. 249 (D.D.C. 1989) (holding that
EPA correctly interpreted the reimbursement section of CERCLA to mean that it
does not apply to companies in midst of a cleanup when the law was enacted), aff'd,
946 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cit. 1991); but see United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 631
(D.N.H. 1988) ("CERCLA retroactively applies to all response costs incurred by
plaintiffs [the government] without limitation to postenactment expenditures.").
7. Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The D.C. Circuit ruled
that the EPA plainly violated the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") notice and
comment requirements in promulgating RCRA hazardous waste definitions, and then
gratuitously invited the agency to continue to use these under the emergency circum-
stances exception in the APA. Id. at 752. These definitions have been in place for
more than 10 years since that decision, under various exigency-driven judicial and
congressional ploys.
8. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 174-75 (4th Cir. 1988)
(dismissing the ex post facto charge by declaring CERCLA is not punitive, without
mentioning CERCLA's treble damages provisions).
10. See, e.g., Wagner Seed Co.'v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310, 317 (2d Cir. 1986) (af-
firming district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction over challenge
on merits to an EPA order, before the EPA had initiated an enforcement action).
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As this necessity-driven nurturing gained momentum, it generated
several additional phenomena. It heightened our sensitivity to envi-
ronmental concerns. It shifted our conceptions about the public inter-
est in private property, thus changing our attitudes about the level and
scope of regulation the polity would and should bear. It increased the
regulatory appetite at all jurisdictional levels. And finally, it tipped
the balance in a variety of second-tier decisions in which the conflict
between public and private interests presented closer questions.
In the wetlands context, the early regulatory takings arguments
were affected by this last phenomenon. In those cases, the Army
Corps of Engineers' standard position was that only a particular pro-
ject had been disapproved. 1' The applicant was welcome to submit
another that the Corps might approve.
For small actors with meager resources, this often was a death knell
and everyone knew it. But even for larger concerns, after multiple
disapprovals it eventually became apparent that, in reality, the only
"permissible" property use was woodcock habitat. (For a while, in
some regions, the fruitful path was to "donate" or create and donate
replacement wetlands.)' 2 Absent a backdrop of decisions that were
straining very hard to uphold more troublesome aspects of the foun-
dational statutes, this strategy would likely have been less successful.
After roughly thirty years of nurturing, the regulatory organism has
grown strong, and is now experiencing a discernable pruning.' 3 This is
illustrated in a variety of ways. Some examples are the apparent revi-
val of divisibility under CERCLA,' 4 cases containing subtle but re-
vealing rhetorical flourishes,' 5 as well as open regulation bashing for
which Justice Scalia has been notable,' 6 and, perhaps even more illus-
trative, defensive EPA give-backs 17 on early successes in the area of
11. See, e.g., Formanek v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 785 (1989).
12. See generally David Salvesen, Banking on Wetlands, URBAN LAND, June 1993,
at 36.
13. This atmosphere of emergency can reemerge around new legislation and may
produce a weak vestige of the nurturing we saw during the organism's infancy. I think
the passage of, and states' acquiescence to, the Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), is an
example of this. See Johnson, supra note 2.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 268-71 (3d
Cir. 1992).
15. See Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155, 157 (7th
Cir. 1988) ("To the point that courts could achieve more of the legislative objectives
by adding to the lists of those responsible, it is enough to respond that statutes have
not only ends but also limits."); Alcan, 964 F.2d at 270 n.29 ("[i]t seems clear that a
defendant could easily be strong-armed into settling [with EPA]").
16. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2898 n.12, 2899
n.14 (referring to "stupid" legislative staffs and legislatures "plundering landowners").
17. See EPA's rulemaking broadening the lender liability exemption under CER-
CLA. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344 (1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300).
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lender liability.18 In a very rough way we can cast the Court's recent
regulatory takings cases, and many other episodes, 9 merely as back-
lash. But I think there is something more going on.
II. UNPACKING THE PENDULUM SWING
As I mentioned, the nurturing phase expanded public tolerance for
regulation by increasing public sensitivity to the interdependence of
all aspects of the environment. That generated an important subtext:
virtually everything we do in modern America, either directly or
through its cumulative effect, consumes or despoils resources. If we
really are serious about conserving the biosphere, it will require regu-
lation and drastic change in virtually every phase of modern American
life. This poses the question that is crucial to putting takings jurispru-
dence, and the general state of environmental regulation, into per-
spective. Have we made the decision to do all that is "necessary" to,
in MTV parlance, "save the planet?"
One might answer that we are still on the fence; that we continue to
act on the open invitation to regulate but have not yet decided how
much comfort we will sacrifice in order to halt or at least slow the rate
of biospheric consumption. For a traditionalist, concerned about how
far an undisciplined response to the invitation to regulate will spin
out, the concept of regulatory takings is an attractive way to force the
public to assign some priorities to the items on its regulatory menu.20
If this is what is happening, the growth of the regulatory takings doc-
trine and the pruning phase generally are adequately explained by a
blunt CLS critique. This view is plausible. But I think it is wrong.2'
I believe we have in fact decided whether or not to do what is "nec-
essary," and have decided not to. Rather, we have affirmatively de-
cided to pursue our current lifestyle, with superficial limitations. In
18. See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991).
19. See, e.g., Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (granting
pre-enforcement review where EPA's access order constituted a compensable taking).
20. Although it is ironic to make this observation here, a related value is protec-
tion of the ultimate minority. If regulation is free to the community, its costs are
forced onto the single individual who alone is left to fight the community decision that
damages him peculiarly and exclusively. In this respect, I think the takings decisions
are appealing.
21. I do think there is a genuine micro-level disagreement between traditionalists
on the one hand, who are committed to resource consumption sufficient to sustain
"freedom and liberty" in something like the manner in which it was conceived during
a time characterized (albeit falsely) by boundless resources, and progressives on the
other hand, who are willing to move away from 18th century conceptions of "liberty"
in the interest of the "environmental preservation" and other 20th century concerns.
On a superficial level, the development of the regulatory takings doctrine and the
evolution of environmental regulation reflect this. But the distance between the two
positions is far less than the tone of the debate suggests.
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the shadows of that choice is a decision to consume the biosphere
nearly as fast as we know how.
The evidence lies in the drastic consumption-reducing measures we
are not discussing, as well as the affirmative public decisions that dis-
close the limits of our political will to make any fundamental lifestyle
changes. These things reflect a shadow conversation in which we have
concluded that our current lifestyle, if moderately controlled, will not
threaten our children's children or theirs, and we have decided to in-
dulge our appetite for comfort and convenience to the profound detri-
ment of the unrepresented future-by which I mean generations so
removed in time that we are emotionally and morally disconnected
from them.22
First, let us look at one of the things we are not discussing seriously.
What would it take to reach a plateau of sustainable living? The
"Center for Sustainable Living" project at Wilson College, in Cham-
bersburg, Pennsylvania, actually moves toward its description. De-
tractors call it the "Hippie Project." The sustainable living it projects
is a pre-industrial lifestyle that, by contemporary standards, is hard
and dirty.
That model, if it is even close to what is "necessary," poses re-
vealing questions that we already have answered. Are we willing to
give up our cars? Are we willing to abandon fossil fuel generated
electricity? Are we willing to avoid nuclear energy until we have re-
solved the spent rod problem? Are we willing to do without the
truckload of poisonous conveniences we all can find under the sink or
in the garage? Are we willing to stop waste disposal in surface wa-
ters? Are we willing to essentially nationalize the land base in order
to make decisions about resource use of the magnitude necessary to
"save the planet"? Will Americans vote to embrace sustainable liv-
ing-in effect, a highly managed but virtually pre-industrial society?
Not in our wildest dreams. We have chosen a course of biospheric
consumption over sustainable living. True, we are left with our faith
in future miracles, but I suspect the unrepresented future would
choose something much more limiting for us.
There is also evidence of our shadow choices in the details of our
foundational environmental statutes and regulations, particularly in
the exceptions, without which ordinary people would suffer serious
lifestyle disruption. Some examples are the RCRA household waste
22. How long do we believe the biosphere will sustain anything close to our cur-
rent lifestyle? A million years? Half a million? Fifty-thousand? Five hundred?
Fifty? As we contemplate these questions several things happen. At some point, we
lose our sense of moral responsibility for future generations.
These are the people who are unrepresented in this conflict against us. They will
have a drastically different view about the choices we should have made. I suspect
they will be appalled at the gross consumption, despoliation, and waste of air, water,
and land that defines western civilization and the American dream.
1995]
562 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VI
exemption,23 the EPA's special treatment of municipalities under
CERCLA, 4 and the extraordinary efforts creating a privileged class
of potentially responsible parties ("PRPs") in revealing instances
where the resource despoiling aspects of everyday life are at the root
of potential environmental liability.25
We see a separate category of examples in the development of what
I will call "soft environmental" regulation. Historic preservation reg-
ulations are some of the best examples. The resources and political
capital we spend on this style of regulation, 6 reflects our broader de-
cision to focus on the quality of our current lifestyle to the detriment
of the unrepresented future.
III. A PERSPECTIVE ON OUR SHADOW CHOICES
It is true that our environmental debates reflect superficial conflict
between traditionalists and progressives about modulating the founda-
tional statutes and on second-tier issues such as regulatory takings.
But fundamentally, we have already decided what conditions make
life worthwhile. What we primarily curtail through regulation is ac-
tion that diminishes the quality of our consumption.
If the intersection of regulatory takings and environmental regula-
tion is part of this phenomenon, the predictable CLS critique is not
adequate. My observations suggest that our generation is unified
through our consumptive lifestyle in a conflict against the unrepre-
sented future. If this is so, a CLS critique explaining the regulatory
takings cases as conservative backlash is not fully explanatory.
Indeed, one needs to return to more traditional critiques of doctri-
nal evolution-explaining doctrinal development as a response to the
objectively discernable needs of the age-to close the gap. That cri-
tique proceeds this way: regardless of their outcomes, our conversa-
tions about regulatory takings and other environmental issues serve
all of us. They are a balm on our collective conscience. They distract
us from the guilt of having so utterly vanquished the unrepresented
future. Our need for this balm and distraction is strong, first, because
23. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(i).
24. See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1205 (2d Cir. 1992) (describ-
ing EPA's policy of selective CERCLA enforcement benefitting municipalities).
25. See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 815 F. Supp. 539, 542 n.4 (D. Conn. 1993)
(abandoning the standard view that the presence of a hazardous substance, regardless
of concentration, triggers CERCLA liability, in order to release "mom and pop"
PRPs from liability). But see United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 755 F. Supp.
531 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) (sustaining Alcan's status as a PRP, despite proof that Alcan's
waste contained concentrations of hazardous substances'no greater than those found
in breakfast cereal and milk).
26. Regulatory takings as a concept to curb otherwise unlimited regulatory appe-
tites may usefully serve as a counterweight to the unbridled regulatory mind-set that
is fueled by cost-free regulation. Indeed, the result may be more direct. If it is diffi-
cult for regulators to predict what might in fact be deemed a regulatory taking, it
might force distinctions between serious regulatory goals and whims.
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our ethos abhors the unfair fight2 7 (of which our conflict with the un-
represented future is the archetype) and, second, because collective
guilt is one of our most powerful social phenomena.2 8 Because our
need is so great, this balming effect emerges as a primary function of
our environmental regulatory debates and doctrinal movements.
CONCLUSION
Our debates permit us to enjoy the fruit of our shadow choices
without the paralyzing guilt that moral actors might expect to accom-
pany such decisions. The debate reminds me of a political advertise-
ment on television some years ago. It showed a look-alike of "Tip"
O'Neill as the symbolic Democrat thundering down the road in a big
gas guzzler, smoking a big cigar and laughing wildly, while the gas
gauge edged toward empty. Adjusted slightly, the image is apt here.
This time we are all in the car. The gauge is still edging toward empty.
We are still laughing and smoking. But periodically, we stop to
demonstrate our essential morality, by having a strident conversation
over whether the solution is to turn the radio up or down.2 9
27. The growth of unconscionability and undue influence doctrine in contract law
are examples.
28. It has played a role in eliciting the wrenching changes of the civil rights move-
ment, and some have argued that it drove even more wrenching decisions 100 years
earlier. See BERTRAM WYATr-BROWN, LEWIS TAPPAN AND THE EVANGELICAL WAR
AGAINST SLAVERY (1969); GILBERT H. BARNES, THE ANTISLAVERY IMPULSE: 1830-
1844 (1964).
29. So what does it mean if I am right? Maybe all it means is that our conversa-
tions should be less strident. Some of us should be less self-righteous, others less
condescending. Maybe that is enough.
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